The changing nature of warfare has seen a paradigm shift from the conventional to asymmetric, contactless warfare such as information and cyber warfare. Excessive dependence on information and communication technologies, cloud infrastructures, big data analytics, data-mining and automation in decision making poses grave threats to business and economy in adversarial environments. Adversarial machine learning is a fast growing area of research which studies the design of Machine Learning algorithms that are robust in adversarial environments. This paper presents a comprehensive survey of this emerging area and the various techniques of adversary modelling. We explore the threat models for Machine Learning systems and describe the various techniques to attack and defend them. We present privacy issues in these models and describe a cyber-warfare test-bed to test the effectiveness of the various attack-defence strategies and conclude with some open problems in this area of research.
INTRODUCTION
Machine learning (ML) and artificial intelligence are ubiquitous and have been extensively used to automate tasks and decision making processes. There has been a tremendous growth and dependence in using ML applications in national critical infrastructures and critical areas such as medicine and healthcare, computer security, spam and malware detection, autonomous driving vehicles, unmanned autonomous systems and homeland security. The critical nature of such systems and their applications demand a high level of defence against cyber attacks. While data scientists successfully automate tasks and use data mining techniques to uncover hidden, yet undiscovered knowledge from the vast unstructured data collected from disparate sources, there are serious concerns in the security issues and vulnerabilities present in data mining and ML systems. In such networks of data and knowledge sources spanning distributed databases of critical nature present in several public, private clouds, and government owned cyber infrastructures, run many ML algorithms to extract useful information and knowledge. They are highly vulnerable in the cyber ecosystem and become the weakest link in the entire chain which can compromise security of the entire system. Medical and health-care domains for instance, using ML need to ensure privacy and data leakage prevention. Recommender systems, Stock market prediction, and Sentiment analysis use ML algorithms for assessing market trends from the data and any malicious change in the data or the underlying algorithms effects the data distributions and end results. This field of ML is an important area of research owing to the growing concerns of security, privacy and over reliance of users on automated decision making. Security of ML models need to be evaluated against adversaries and defences are to be set up to ensure robust designs against adversarial attacks as shown in Fig. 1 .
In this study, we explore the emerging area of adversarial machine learning (AML) which is the design of machine learning algorithms that are robust to various attacks under the constraints of the knowledge and capabilities of the adversaries. The study of AML helps in two ways: first, we can plan strategies and course of actions to model and counter against adversarial behaviour; second is to understand and model the adversary in order to strengthen our defences against the actions. These are used for red teaming in a cyberwarfare testbed.
VULNeRABILITIeS IN MAChINe
LeARNINg ALgORIThMS Vulnerabilities exist in machine learning models implemented to generate information from data. An important source of vulnerability lies in the faulty assumptions made while designing and training the ML model.
Data scientists design ML models to be robust and accurate, and they implicitly assume to preserve privacy; however this assumption is not true and leads to serious breach in privacy.
Researchers have modelled ML systems on linearly separable data and use linear function as decision function to reduce the computation complexity. This assumption increases the overall mis-classifications as an adversary can create adversarial examples to further degrade the performance of the model.
In some cases, collection of data is done in unsupervised manner and in adversarial settings like collecting data from honeypot servers. This allows attackers to carefully craft adversarial examples to be collected as data which may degrade the model since the adversary has direct access to the training data.
Different data instances are considered to be independent and identically distributed. Some authors, for convenience and ease of computation, assume that the features are independent of each other. however, an adversary can try to obtain the correlation between different data points and features to introduce instances from different data distribution to degrade the model's performance.
One of the major vulnerabilities in ML models is that the models perform well on testing and training data as they are usually drawn from the same underlying distribution. If the data from some other distribution is used as an input, the model will behave differently. This is the basic vulnerability that is exploited by attackers to craft adversarial examples to evade the model or degrade its performance.
MODeLLINg The ADVeRSARy
Due to the critical nature of the applications of ML, it is important to model the adversary and his strategies to attack the decision making algorithms, to represent a realistic adversary in a cyber warfare scenario.
The concept of AML was formally introduced by huang 1 , et al. who proposed a taxonomy of adversarial attacks and the adversary modelled using the triple: Capability, knowledge and goals.
Adversarial Capabilities
Adversarial capabilities refer to the possible impact or influence that an adversary can have by attacking the ML model. Attacks of the adversary based on the capabilities can be classified according to the following three dimensions:
Classification based on influence of adversary is based on the attempt to change the dataset or the algorithms of the target during the course of the attack. Such attacks can be further classified according to the influence as causative or exploratory.
Causative: Causative attacks alter the training process through influence over the training data. This requires the adversary to modify or influence both training and testing data.
Exploratory: Exploratory attacks do not alter the training process but use other techniques, such as probing, to discover information about training data. The adversary cannot modify or manipulate the training data and can only craft new instances based on the underlying data distribution.
The specificity of the attacks determines whether the attacks modify or effect the model as a whole based on multiple attack vectors or by using a specific attack vector to attack the model. Attacks can be classified according to specificity as:
• Targeted: In a targeted attack, the focus is on a single or small set of target points. is indiscriminate and adversary just tries to maximise the total number of mis-classifications to reduce the overall accuracy and confidence of the model.
•
Targeted Mis-classification: The adversary generates a carefully crafted adversarial example from random noise using various algorithms and the model mis-classifies the noise as a legitimate sample. The perturbation is carefully selected unlike the previous case.
• Source/Target Mis-classification: An input of particular type is modified by carefully adding perturbation to be classified as a specific target class which can subvert the logic of the entire ML system. Consider an example of a ML model checking for malware and one malware instance is modified by adding perturbation to be classified as benign. This usually takes place during test time and effects only the testing data.
Adversarial Knowledge
Knowledge of the underlying ML model plays a crucial role in determining the success of the attacks by providing the adversary an opportunity to make informed decisions as shown in Fig. 3 . The knowledge of the ML system can be classified into:
Algorithm and parameters • Training and output The adversary may have either complete or perfect knowledge of the ML system or only a partial knowledge of the system. Adversary attacks can be classified into black box attacks and white box attacks based on the knowledge about the model an adversary has.
Complete/perfect knowledge: An adversary is said to have perfect knowledge if he has access to the knowledge of data acquisition, data, feature selection, ML algorithms and tuned parameters of the model. The attacker may or may not have access to the training data which can be easily acquired by using other knowledge. This is usually the case when the ML model is open source and everyone has access to it.
Limited Knowledge: In this case, the adversary only knows a part of the model. he does not have access to the training data and may have very limited information about the model architecture, parameters, and has access to only a small subset of the total knowledge available.
For the adversary to evolve from black box to white box, he iteratively goes through a process of learning using inference mechanisms to gain more knowledge of the model.
Adversarial goals
based on the goals and intent of the adversary for attacking the ML model we can classify them into the following:
Integrity violation: The adversary performs malicious activity without compromising the normal system operation but the output of the model is of attacker's choosing. Poisoning attacks are an example of integrity violation.
Availability violation: The adversary compromises the system functionality with an intent to cause a denial of service to users during the operations. One way is to maximise the mis-classification or effect the output of model significantly to degrade the performance of the model and make it to crash.
Privacy Violation: The adversary tries to gain information about sensitive user data from the ML model and also extract key information about the model architecture. Model inversion, member inference, reverse engineering and side channel on ML models are examples of such attacks. 
ADVeRSARIAL ATTACKS
In this section, we explore the various attacks on ML models. An adversary implements attacks by generating perturbed data instances called adversarial examples. A data instance may be carefully modified where the perturbations are calculated using algorithms to cause the ML classifier to mis-classify with high confidence. The goal is to construct adversarial examples '
x such that it is very close to the input image x where ( ') Fx T = , T being the target class, and F being the decision function. A simple indiscriminate approach is gradient ascent during training of ML model.
The fast gradient sign method (FgSM) is one of the ways to generate adversarial examples that was proposed by goodfellow 2 , et al. Let θ be the parameters of the model, x denotes input to the model, y denotes the targets associated with x (for a supervised learning paradigm) and (, , )
J xy θ denote the cost function to train the neural network as shown in Fig. 4 . The cost function can be linearised around the current value of θ , to obtain an optimal max-norm constrained perturbation of ( , , )
, et al. showed that real world systems like cameras and sensors were vulnerable to adversarial examples by introducing the basic iterative method to generate adversarial images by modifying the FgSM. As an extension, they introduced label leaking effect which occurs when the accuracy on adversarial images becomes higher than the accuracy on clean images 4 . Dense adversary generation algorithm 5 generates a large family of adversarial examples to exploit semantic segmentation and object detection.
The Jacobian based saliency map approach to search for adversarial examples by modifying a small number of input pixels in an image was proposed by Papernot 6 , et al. They compute the Jacobian of a model to identify the sensitivity of model or decision boundary. They use adversarial saliency map that contains information about the likelihood of misclassification for a given input feature.
Carlini-Wagner adversarial example 7 capable of evading all present defences including defensive distillation 72 . given an input x , we would want to find ' x and minimise ( , ') Dxx such that ( ') Fx T = and '
x is valid where D is the distance function. The minimisation problem was reformulated by adding a loss function ( ') gx that measures the closeness of ( ') Fx to T .
time attack that does not require accessing and manipulating the training data. The goal is to find a sample ' x such that the distance from target malicious sample 0 x is minimised 81 : ' arg min ( )
, et al. study the effectiveness of evading PDF rate ML system using adversarial examples by manipulating the header fields in PDF format. An improvement was proposed 10 using an oracle which uses a function threshold to classify them as benign or malicious. A secure learning model against evasion attacks on PDF malware detection was proposed by Khorshidpour 11 , et al. An attack on text classifiers trained using DNNs was proposed 12 using three attack strategies, namely, insertion, modification and removal of text computed using FgSM algorithm.
Poisoning Attacks
Poisoning attacks force an anomaly detection algorithm to accept an attack point that lies outside of the normal set of data instances. The attacker adds such adversarial examples to the training data so that the ML model's decision boundary can be manipulated. Poisoning is a train time attack and requires access to training data. Kloft 13 , et al. introduced poisoning attacks and analysed online centroid anomaly detection and adversarial noise for poisoning. In face recognition, it is possible to poison face templates with limited attacker knowledge 14 . boiling frog attack 1 , a type of poisoning attack, poisons the model over several weeks by adding small amounts of chaff. The detector is gradually acclimated to chaff and fails to identify the large amount of poisoning done incrementally. An iterative attack by selecting inputs which results in highest degradation in classification accuracy was explored using healthcare datasets 15 .
equation Solving Attack
The equation solving attack 16 is applicable on cloud providers who provide ML as a service via APIs and for models such as multi-layer perceptron, binary logistic regression and multi-class logistic regression where they are represented as equations in known and unknown variables. The goal is to use the data to find the unknown variables, which are usually the parameters used to train the models. These attacks are expected to reveal information about the model and its architecture to the attacker.
Path Finding Attack
Path-finding attacks 16 are used to traverse binary trees, multi-n-ary trees, and regression trees. In these attacks, the value of each input feature is varied till the conditions at each node are satisfied, while the input traverses the tree. The tree is traversed until a leaf is reached or an internal node with a split over a missing feature is found. The value of the leaf node is the output which reveals the path followed.
Model Inversion Attack
Fredrikson 17 , et al. propose an algorithm that computes the optimal input feature vector close to the target feature vector using a weighted probability estimate that indicates the correct 
evasion Attacks
Evasion attacks evade the ML model by passing an adversarial example so that the model misclassifies. It is a test value. The least-biased maximum a posteriori (MAP) estimate for input feature vector further minimises the adversary's incorrect predictions. This is used to create an overall model which is very close to the target model.
Black Box Attacks using Transferability Property
In black box attacks, the adversary has no access to the data and the model. The attacker can only access the oracle that returns an output for the input chosen by the attacker. ML model on cloud is an example of black box scenario where the adversary has no access to internals of the model and the training data. The service provider provides a training API using which the user can send data to the cloud to train the model and a prediction API to query the model and obtain predictions as output. In such a scenario, the adversary needs to alleviate lack of knowledge of the model and lack of knowledge of the training data.
The lack of knowledge of model can be alleviated using the property of transferability which states that samples crafted to mislead model A are likely to mislead model b. The transferability property of adversarial examples exists as they span a contiguous subspace of large dimensionality which intersect enabling transferability 18 . Transferability can be achieved in two ways 19 : Cross-training Data Transferability: There are two different instances of data: data A and data B. The attacker trains the local model which is the same as the target model and on local model using data A while data b is used to train target model. Adversarial examples are tested on the local model which is used to attack the target model as shown in Fig. 5 .
the oracle and gets a confidence score for the prediction based on which the attacker decides the validity of the synthetic data. This data and the corresponding labels given as output by the oracle are used to create a substitute for the local data. Papernot 19 , et al. use reservoir sampling to improve the previous training procedure for the substitute model. They developed a generalised algorithm for black box attacks using transferability that exploit adversarial sample transferability on broad classes of ML algorithms. This was demonstrated using a deep neural network (DNN) trained on google and Amazon cloud services 20 as shown in Fig. 7 . An ensemble based approach to generate transferable adversarial examples was proposed to attack black box models on the cloud 21 . hayes 22 , et al. introduce a direct attack against black-box neural networks (NNs) that uses another neural network to learn to craft adversarial examples and did not use transferability of adversarial examples unlike previous work. 
Cross Technique Transferability:
In this case, the attacker has access to the same data that was used to train the target model. however, he does not have access to the model internals and the local model is different from the target model. The attacker tries various model combinations to get the most optimal pair to generate the adversarial examples as shown in Fig. 6 .
The lack of knowledge of data can be alleviated by using synthetic data generation. The adversary sends synthetic data to
Member Inference Attack
In member inference attacks, the attacker finds if a query passed to the prediction API is part of the training set and if so leak the training data information 23 .The authors implement shadow models which predict whether the input is part of the data or not.
ATTACKS ON VARIOUS MAChINe LeARNINg PARADIgMS
Various attacks on machine learning paradigms, namely, supervised, unsupervised and reinforcement learning are discussed here.
Supervised Learning
In supervised learning, the data passed to the ML model has labels associated with each input instance. This helps in supervising the model to classify or predict values for new data instances. If the target label is a continuous range of values, it is referred to as regression problem and if the target label is a discrete value, it is referred to as classification problem. Attack models on classification models, regression models, Support vector machines (SVM) and NNs are described as follows.
Classification Models: biggio 24 , et al. present techniques to hide the classifier information from the adversary by introducing randomness in the decision function. Further, biggio [25] [26] , et al. argue for improving the robustness of classifiers by an over/ under emphasis of input features of the data. The adversarial classifier reverse engineering (ACRE) learning problem 27 was introduced to learn sufficient information about a classifier so as to construct adversarial attacks by reverse engineering linear classifiers with either continuous or Boolean features.
Regression Models: Regression problems in which an adversary can exercise some control over the data generation process were first studied by Grobhans 28 , et al. They model the problem as a bayesian game and characterise conditions under which a unique bayesian equilibrium point exists.
Attacks on Support Vector Machines: SVMs have been shown to be vulnerable to label flip attacks where the data labels are flipped in training data. There are two different strategies for contaminating the training set through label flipping: random and adversarial label flips 8 .
Random Label Flips:
The attacker randomly selects a number of samples from the training data and flip their labels.
Adversarial Label Flips: The adversary aims to find the combination of label flips which maximises the classification error on the untainted testing data. Different combinations of label flips are iterated to measure the classification error corresponding to each combination and retain that combination which gives maximum classification error and use it to attack the SVM.
A family of poisoning attacks using gradient ascent based on SVMs optimal solution have been shown to significantly increase the error 29 . A model for the analysis of label noise in support vector learning and modification of the SVM formulation that compensates for the noise by correcting the kernel matrix was suggested by biggio 8 . A novel technique where an optimisation function was used to find label flips to maximise error classification using Tikhonov regularisation was proposed by Xiao 30 . heuristic approach was used as an extension to improve the performance 31 . burkard 32 , et al. examine the targeted attack on a SVM that learns from a continuous data stream.
Attacks on Neural Networks: Szegedy 33 , et al. were the first to identify the misclassification of NNs due to perturbed images. A maliciously trained neural network or backdoor neural network that has good performance on the user's training and validation samples, but performs poorly on specific attackerchosen inputs was introduced 34 . The Deep Fool algorithm 35 efficiently computes perturbations that fool deep networks by minimising the distance between the adversarial example and the target example corresponding to a target class. Munoz 36 , et al. extend the poisoning attacks to multi-class problems and propose a poisoning algorithm based on backgradient optimisation to compute the gradient of interest through automatic differentiation to drastically reduce the attack complexity. Adversarial attacks were shown to be effective against Convolutional NN 37 and categorical and sequential Recurrent NNs using computational graph unfolding 38 .
Unsupervised Learning
In unsupervised learning, data does not have any labels associated with it and only contains the input features. These are used to cluster or group the data together based on similar input features or learn a new representation of data. Attacks on unsupervised ML models can be categorised into generative Models, Autoencoders and Clustering algorithms.
Generative Models: A generative model learns the underlying probability distributions of training data to generate and give an estimate of function fitting the distribution which enables model to generate new samples. generative adversarial networks (gAN) 39 are a type of generative models that generate new samples by using two networks to play a game against each other. A discriminator network estimates the probability that the data is real or fake while the generative network transforms input to randomly generated samples as output and is trained to fool the discriminator network.MalgAN 40 generates adversarial malware examples, which are able to bypass blackbox ML based detection models using a substitute detector. A generative network is trained to minimise the generated adversarial examples' malicious probabilities predicted by the substitute detector, making the retraining based defensive method against adversarial examples ineffective. APE-GAN 41 defends against the adversarial examples by eliminating the adversarial perturbation using a trained network and then feed the processed example to classification networks.
Autoencoders: Autoencoder is a neural network variant used for unsupervised learning where the number of neurons is same in the input and output layer. This reduces the image and represents it using less number of features (latent representation) thereby creating a sparse representation of input data for image compression, removing noisy images and creates new images. Three classes of attacks on the variational autoencoder (VAE) and VAE-gAN architectures were presented by Kos 42 , et al. The first attack attaches a classifier to the trained encoder of the target generative model which is used to indirectly manipulate the latent representation. The second attack uses the VAE loss function to generate a target reconstruction image from the adversarial example. The third attack is based on optimising the differences in source and target latent representations.
A method to distort the input image to mislead the autoencoder in reconstructing a completely different target image was given by Tabacof 43 , et. al. They design an attack on the internal latent representations to make the adversarial input produce an internal representation similar to the target's representation. Makhzani 44 , et al. propose the adversarial autoencoder (AAE), which is a probabilistic autoencoder that uses generative adversarial networks (gAN) to perform variational inference by matching the aggregated posterior of the hidden code vector of the autoencoder with an arbitrary prior distribution.
Clustering : Clustering is organising a set of data points into groups of similar features called clusters. A clustering algorithm can be formalised as a function : i f x , where i={1,...,n}, and, ( ) C f D = is the clustering output and
Clustering is extensively used to infer and understand data without labels and is vulnerable to two main categories of attacks:
• Poisoning : Adversary aims to maximise the distance between cluster C obtained from data D and cluster C' obtained from contaminated data ' D where ' A is a set of adversarial samples, i.e, '
•
Obfuscation or Bridging :
The goal is to hide attack samples in clusters without effecting the output. Bridges are formed between clusters which result in combining in clusters. Attacker's goal is to minimise the distance between C target and C'
. These models are vulnerable mainly due to the inter-cluster distance which solely depend on the distance between closest points in the cluster which when minimised, allows attackers to form a bridge and combine the clusters 45 . The single link and complete link hierarchical clustering are vulnerable to bridging and poisoning attacks [47] [48] .
Reinforcement Learning
In the reinforcement learning paradigm, an agent is placed in a situation without knowledge of any goals or other information about the environment. For every action made by the agent, it receives a feedback from the environment in the form of a reward. The agent tries to maximise the reward by optimising its actions over time and the agent learns to achieve its goals. In an adversarial setting, there are multiple agents and an agent wins a game when it is given a positive reinforcement and its opponent is given negative reinforcement. Maximising reward corresponds directly to winning games and over time the agent learns to act so that it wins the game. uther 49 , et al. introduce algorithms to handle the multiagent, adversarial, and continuous-valued aspects of the domain by extending prioritised sweeping that allows generalisation of learnt knowledge over neighbouring states in the domain and to allow the handling of continuous state spaces. behzadan 50 , et al. establish that reinforcement learning techniques based on Deep Q-Networks (DQNs) are vulnerable to adversarial input perturbations and verify using the transferability of adversarial examples across different DQN models. They present attacks that enable policy manipulation and induction in the learning process of DQNs. huang 51 , et al. show that adversarial attacks are also effective when targeting neural network policies in reinforcement learning using transferability across policies to attack the Reinforcement Learning model. A method for reducing the number of adversarial examples that need to be injected for a successful attack based on the value function was proposed by Kos 52 . It was observed that retraining on random noise and FgSM perturbations improves the resilience against adversarial examples. Lin 53 , et al. introduce two tactics, strategically timed attack and the enchanting attack, to attack reinforcement learning agents using adversarial examples. In the strategically-timed attack, the adversary aims at minimising the agent's reward by attacking the agent at a small subset of time steps. In the enchanting attack, the adversary aims at luring the agent to a designated target state by combining a generative model to predict the future states and a planning algorithm to generate a preferred sequence of actions for luring the agent.
PRIVACy PReSeRVINg MAChINe
LeARNINg Privacy preserving techniques enable to use ML on data without knowing underlying content of user's data. We study various privacy preserving models that have been proposed to ensure the protection of sensitive data. One of the main reasons for leakage of information through ML models is due to over fitting due to which generalisation becomes very important. Privacy preserving ML has followed three major directions:
In CryptoNets [54] [55] , the authors perform neural network computations on data encrypted using hE and used approximations to evaluate the Sigmoid, ReLu and max pooling. The computation is slow due to the noise generated from hE and security parameters of hE should be considered carefully based on the noise. Rouhani 56 , et al. propose a method to perform DL computation using garbled circuits (gC) and adopt pre-processing techniques to reduce the gC runtime by mapping the NN to a lower dimension. Ohrimenko 57 , et al. propose a solution for secure multiparty ML by using trusted Intel SgX processors and used oblivious protocols between client and server where the input and outputs are blinded. Mohassel 58 , et al. use a two server model and distribute the data into two parts for each server. The authors developed new privacy preserving protocols for linear regression, logistic regression and NNs and used garbled circuits for privacy and arithmetic with pre-computed triplets.
Differential privacy has been explored to ensure privacy guarantees for ML models for non-convex objective functions using differentially private stochastic gradient descent 59, 61 . Shokri 60 , et al. designed a model where participants use parameter sharing, allowing participants to benefit from other participants' models without explicit sharing of training inputs. After each round of training, participants asynchronously share with each other the gradients they computed for some of the parameters.
DeFeNCeS AgAINST ADVeRSARIAL
ATTACKS Many approaches to building defences against adversarial attacks have been proposed over the past few years. We present different possible defences that have been proposed over the years and discuss their shortcomings. gradient masking is based on the idea that if the model is non-differentiable or the model's gradient is zero at data points, then gradient based attacks are ineffective. Two major types of gradient masking are gradient hiding and gradient smoothing. Gradient Hiding uses models that are non-differentiable and are highly non-linear which prevent the adversary from finding the derivative. Gradient smoothing reduces the effectiveness of white-box attacks by smoothing out the model's gradient, leading to numerical instabilities in attacks such as the FgSM. however, in both white-box and black-box settings, models are still vulnerable even after using gradient masking 62 . Papernot [63] [64] , et al. designed a defence based on distillation technique where the authors leverage the softmax layer of neural network. A low value of temperature parameter T will result in high confidence but discrete probabilities while a high value of T will reduce confidence of prediction but smooth out the probability distribution which makes crafting of adversarial examples hard. Carlini 65 , et al. argued that the softmax layer and function used does not change output even if input is changed beyond certain values which was not considered in defensive distillation. They suggested dividing the inputs to the softmax by T before passing them to the function. To make it more robust, Papernot 66 , et al. improved the defence to extended defensive distillation and modified their previous defensive distillation to address the numerical instabilities in the previous model and attacks like black box attacks using transferability. They modified the algorithm and instead of using the probabilities from first model they measured the uncertainties in classifying output using dropout inference. Szegedy 33 , et al. increase the model's robustness by injecting adversarial examples to the training data referred to as adversarial training which was extended to ensemble adversarial training that additionally augments training data with perturbed inputs transferred from a number of fixed pretrained models 67 . Adversarial training to the text domain was explored by applying perturbations to the word embedded in a recurrent neural network 68 . Xu 69 , et al. detect adversarial examples by reducing the colour depth of each pixel in an image, and spatial smoothing to reduce the difference among individual pixels. They compare the model's output with and without using feature squeezing and differentiate between adversarial or benign based on the output. A safety net architecture was proposed by Lu 70 , et al. that consists of the original classifier and an adversary detector which looks at the internal state of the later layers in the original classifier to detect adversarial examples. Similar work was explored Metzen 71 . Reject on negative impact (RONI) defence 72 is a technique that measures the empirical effect of each training instance and eliminates from training those points that have a substantial negative impact on classification accuracy.
Data transformations like dimensionality reduction using Principal component analysis and data anti-whitening to enhance the resilience of ML models were explored by bhagoji 73 , et al. however, adversarial examples can be made robust to data transformations like rescaling, translation, and rotation and an approach that produces images that remain adversarial examples even after transformations 74 . The security of linear classifier itself can be improved by using evenly weighted feature weights as this would require the attacker to manipulate more features to evade detection 75 . Feature selection methods are also compromised under attack 76 . An adversary-aware feature selection model that can improve classifier security against evasion attacks was proposed by selecting a feature subset that maximises the generalisation capability of the classifier 77 . It includes forward selection and backward elimination wrapping algorithms, which iteratively add or delete a feature from the current candidate set. Feature squeezing techniques successfully detect the recent CarliniWagner adversarial examples 69 .
The various defences described in this section are specific to models using a particular learning algorithm. As a result, a defence mechanism that is applicable to one model is not applicable to some other model. however, there is no silver bullet to defend all ML systems against adversarial attacks.
DISCUSSIONS AND CONCLUSIONS
Cyberwargames are designed to examine how organisations and critical response teams respond to realistic/ simulated cyber crises and highly skilled adversaries. The wargaming process comprises of the identification, defence, response, and recovery phases to a cyberattack in depth. Cyberwargames that use game Theory to model the attackers and defenders are designed by setting up a cyber test-bed to exercise cyberattack scenarios on a network environment [78] [79] [80] . In the game theoretic framework, two approaches have been used: a probabilistic framework and a bayesian belief framework where the attack and defender try to anticipate the opponent's strategy with complete and incomplete information with learning. In this paper, we describe the various components of cyber attacks in adversarial machine learning environments namely: Vulnerabilities of ML models in cyber warfare settings, adversary modelling, attack modelling, defence modelling and data privacy in ML models. In this comprehensive survey, we integrate the various adversarial machine learning techniques in the cyber warfare setting to analyse the dynamic attack and defence strategies to improve the security of the simulated system. 
